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In answering the question 'what is special about the gene' from a literary perspective, 
the article suggests that if literary appreciation is often seen as a mark of human 
exceptionalism, knowledge of the gene may undermine this claim. Tracing some of 
the historical and philosophical complexities that circulate around the word 'gene', the 
article argues that in one sense 'the gene' plays the lead role in the latest 'story' about 
heredity to preoccupy novelists, scientists, and the literary and cultural historians who 
have researched their shared interests and mutual borrowings. Reading Ian McEwan's 
recent novel Saturday (2005) in terms of the traditions of scientific and literary 
discourse that it draws upon and weaves together, the article argues that the literary 
craft may yet pose a distinctive challenge for the understanding of the place of 




Literature, it may be argued, is the form of expression par excellence both for 
claiming and exploring human exceptionalism. Genetics, on the other hand, may turn 
out to be the science, par excellence, which debunks the claim to human 
exceptionialism. As Matt Ridley narrates in his book Nature Via Nurture (2003), in 
the late 1960s, the work of Vincent Sarich and Allan Wilson indicated that close to 
99% of the DNA in the human being is identical to that of a chimpanzee. The work of 
Roy Britten in 2002 reduced the scale of the difference to around 5%. Even so, the 
fact that we are, genetically, 95% like a chimpanzee is of little comfort.2 To think that 
Bishop Samuel Wilberforce taunted T.H. Huxley at the British Association for the 
advancement of Science, Oxford, in 1860 at the prospect of the latter’s being a mere 
50% of simian descent.3  
 
How can literature ‘speak to’ genetics, and genetics to literature? Of course, this 
question has, in a sense, already been answered, having been posed again and again: 
‘expressiveness’ has played no small part in the history of encounters between the 
evolutionary sciences and the seemingly ‘softer’ pursuits of philosophy and theology 
as modes of ‘literary’ discourse. This paper will survey some of the key ways in 
which the conversation has been, and is being, conducted (Section 1). It will explore 
the insistent philosophical and ideological complexities that condition ‘literature’ as 
an historically self-aware tradition of discourse in dialogue with disciplines and fields 
that constitute and demarcate objects of scientific knowledge. Of course, as the 
critical realist Roy Bhaskar would argue, genetics is part of the ‘intransitive’ 
ontological domain which exists independently of human activity. But in so far as 
knowledge of the gene is elaborated by scientific research, then, as critical realism 
also recognises, the gene is a multi-faceted object of knowledge, entering into the 
‘transitive’ domain of human understanding that is both perspectival and saturated 
with multiple traditions of discourse and human activity.4 The dialogic work 
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performed by literature reminds us that the intellectual life of the gene – that is to say 
the gene as a conceptual object disseminated by intellectual activity – is grounded in 
discourses, fictions (in their broadest sense), and culture. The article will read Ian 
McEwan’s Saturday (2005) – a ‘literary’ fiction – as a dialogic act which explores the 
gene at the interface between what Bhaskar refers to as transitive and the intransitive 
domains (Section 2). McEwan is a novelist who interrogates the relationship between 
genetics as an ontological necessity, and the traditional literary and philosophical 
frameworks that have sustained and validated accounts of human specificity and 
distinctiveness. 
 
1. Literature and Science: historical and philosophical perspectives 
 
What marginal effects do human genes play to make us human, rather than 
chimpanzee, and what is a gene anyway? Matt Ridley identifies seven meanings of 
the word gene, and seven different functions – few of which contribute decisively to 
human exceptionalism. First, a gene may be conceived as a Dawkinsian survival 
machine, using any genomic structure as a host for preserving itself on into the next 
generation; it is also a Mendelian archive, preserving an ancestral past in the living 
organism, based on a Watson-Crick recipe of DNA replicators. All of these theories 
and functions build on De Vries’s early sense of heredity conducted by pangens 
(hereditary material reused in different developmental programmes). A clearer degree 
of human specificity is made possible by the Jacob-Monod theory of the gene as a 
developmental switch, a means of ‘promoting’ and ‘enhancing’ a particular 
characteristic in a given bodily design; this also links, perhaps, to the medical theory 
of the gene as a health-giver, ensuring a healthy outcome in the expected 
environment. Finally, the theory of the evolutionary psychologists Tooby and 
Cosmides embraces all of the above, and has come to see the gene as a device for 
extracting information from the environment. The gene is not, it seems, wholly 
deterministic. The decisively human part of us continues to be ‘made’ by our 
‘exchange’ of information with the environment – what we have become used, 
perhaps, to describing as the work of ‘culture’.5 
 
If the gene has multiple functions, it is also hard to be definite about its borders and 
boundaries. As Richard Dawkins admits in his classic The Selfish Gene ‘it is not easy, 
indeed it may not even be meaningful, to decide where one gene ends and another 
begins’.6 Dawkins makes this comment as he describes the process of looking 
through a microscope at the 46 (23 pairs) human chromosomes, with genes strung ou
along them ‘in order’. Dawkins’s observation continues to shape research, almost 
thirty years after its original publication. In a recent article about ‘gene autonomy’, 





Rediscovered in 1900 from the research of Gregor Mendel (1822-
1884), and named in 1909 by Wilhelm Johannsen (1857-1927), the 
gene became one of the most influential scientific concepts of the 
20th century. Yet despite its iconic power, it remains a curiously 
nebulous entity that defies easy definition. From the start, there was 
a tension between the concept of the gene as a ‘unit of inheritance’ – 
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which was defined in purely operational terms as an autonomous 
unit that transmits specific traits through multiple generations – and 






o interrogates the force of various mobilisations of the ‘literary’ in that 
ogue 
ies: 
relation to other genes on the chromosome.7 
 
Dillon’s work contributes to the critical-realist aspirations of much scientific research: 
acknowledging genes as a necessary part of ontological reality, while recognisin
knowledge of that reality is historically relative and subject to refinement and 
elaboration. I want to explore some of the tensions produced by this process of 
refinement and elaboration: the gene as either absolute determinant, or recept
gene as either autonomous unit of inheritance or real physical entity. Both point t
certain degree of play at work in the making of the concept of the gene. It is 
significant that Dillon should go back to the moment of ‘naming’ of the gene by 
Wilhelm Johannsen; and that he refers to the ‘iconic’ power of the concept of the 
gene. I’ll explore this power in relation to what the philosopher Howard Caygill has 
referred to as ‘the culture of the gene’, a transitive culture of metaphysical fictions 
that needs to be distinguished from the expert, professional day-to-day field work th
constitutes molecular biology and biochemistry as it seeks to research more deeply 
into the intransitive domain. I’ll use this to show how another ‘fiction’ by Ian 
McEwan, his recent novel Saturday, intervenes into this ‘culture of the gene’.8 It 




Turning to the ‘literary’, one can note that the power of textual analogy plays a 
strikingly important role in the conceptualisation of modern genetics. In Darwin’s 
Dangerous Idea (1995) Daniel Dennett grasped the workings of the Mendelian 
archive, ‘the Library of Mendel’, by analogy with a textual and philological anal
that followed Borges’s imaginary ‘Library of Babel’. The literary and textual 
analogues structure the way in which Roy Britten arrived at his conclusion that 
humans differ from chimpanzees by virtue of 5% of their DNA. He draws on the 
language of codes and substitutions. As Ridley points out, Britten identifies the 
‘textual deletions and insertions’ that increase the scale of the difference from 1 to 
5%; prior to Britten’s work, molecular biologists had only focused on ‘substitutions – 
ie, letters in the text that are different between human and chimpanzee genes’.9 
Dawkins’s Selfish Gene also uses bibliographic metaphors to describe chromosomes, 
the copying mechanism of DNA, and Mendelian laws of inheritance. The language of 
ode, and the acts of copying, deleting, insertion may be comfortingly recognisable to c
literary scholars as the very objects and concerns of their own scholarly pursuits. 
 
But only some literary scholars would recognise themselves in such a set of analog
for instance, bibliographers and historians of the book. That is why I’ve added the 
health warning to my discussion: a literary perspective, for literature is a complex 
field of critical possibilities and historical legacies. For instance, some literary 
scholars are theoreticians and deconstructionists; others are historicists. Indeed, it is 
unnecessary to drive a wedge between them, as many critics bring together a blend 
between the two, and their work is consequently nuanced and inflected. In any event, 
all literary criticism needs to be seen in the context of the histories and traditions of 
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discourse that continue to inform it. Indeed, my reading of McEwan’s Saturday trace
echoes of literary criticism’s long historical reflection on the relation between the
affective power of poetry and morality, woven into a key moment of narrative crisis 
sparked by genetic malfunction in one of the novel’s characters. But the public, 
justificatory languages of genetic science need to be seen in the same context. Howard 
Caygill makes the same point about the varied traditions philosophical and scientific
thought that inform what he calls the ‘culture of the gene’. It is important to stress this
variety, complexity and historicity; since the ‘Sokal Affair’ hoax of 1996, there h
been a tendency for leading proponents of the public understanding of science – such 
as the gene theorist Richard Dawkins – to homogenise thinking from across the 
Humanities and Social Sciences negatively as the product of ‘social constuctivism
the indefensibly reductive notion that science is just another form of textuality. It is 








st drives – the postmodern textual and the neo-Darwinian genetic. My own 






from Crick and 










This tendency to neo-Darwinian reductionism has perhaps pushed many scholars 
away from a Whiggish present in which the gene dominates, and towards the more 
varied scientific tapestry of the past. For literary scholars who have explored the 
literature and science relation, they have focused on it in historically contextual ter
Take my own period of specialisation, the nineteenth century, and its apparent displa
of ‘a common culture’. While the so-called ‘common culture’ thesis of the social 
historian of science Robert M. Young can be taken too far, there is something about 
the intelligibility of nineteenth-century biology that continues to fascinate and in a 
curious way, perhaps reassure.10 The disciplines that lent to its formation, at least in 
its pre-1859 phase – geology, comparative anatomy, and classification – depended to 
a large degree on evidence that was available to public display in its primary forms
The molecular biology of genetics is a science that requires not only high degrees of
specialisation, and intensive laboratory resources, but depends also on speculativ
model building that relates to the deeply ‘unseen’ and ‘unseeable’ (
W
models of molecular activity derived from x-ray crystallography). 
 
Let’s keep with an historical perspective. What interests literary scholars and cultural 
historians, and another reason why the effects of the concept of the gene may not be
uniquely special to us, is often not so much the validity of the truth claims of the late
scientific theory of inheritance, which is genetics, but the structure and ideolog
leanings of theories of inheritance from the past. For these theories cast light on the 
authority of theories at work in the present, and the semantic possibilities and 
constraints that they offer. In fact, historically-orientated literary scholars are often 
interested in the languages of inheritance within a scheme of ‘cultural heredity’: 
is to say where these languages come from, what work they perform, what the
on’, and whether indeed they are passed on at all. We should recall that Charles 
Darwin’s own theory of heredity – ‘pangenesis’ – that postulated the idea of 
gemmules that represented every aspect of a body, including acquired characteristic
being transmitted to and out of the sexual organs – went precisely nowhere.11 But 
‘pangenesis’ is fascinating nonetheless for what it says about Darwin’s interests in 
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pollen and buds as agents of heredity, and a nineteenth-century idea about the bod
a kind of confederated colony of organs. In other words, entangled with the properly
delimited scientific speculation about 
y as 
 
inheritance was a world of discourse about 
















istorians are precisely interested in the 




widely in nineteenth-century culture. 
 
To give another example: in the 1880s, the German biologist August Weism
formulated his theory of the ‘continuity of the germ plasm’. If Darwin’s theory of 
natural selection, and Darwin’s writings in general, could be assimilated to 
Lamarckian theories of the inheritance of acquired characteristics, Weismann’s the
was resolutely anti-Lamarckian. Heredity, for Weismann, was effected by material 
that was passed reproductively from one generational body to another, but which 
could not be improved by external influence. Weismann’s theory impacted on debates 
in Europe, in particular debates about degeneration. The English writer Benjamin 
Kidd in his influential degenerationist tract Social Evolution (1894) used the theor
a basis for concluding that the quality of populations would decline, generation upon
generation if natural logics of inheritance were permitted to continue unchecked. 
Degenerationists such as Kidd argued that the least ‘fit’ populations, in class term
were in numerical supremacy, and destined to pass on their ‘unfitness’ through th
germ plasm; acquired characteristics could play no corrective role. For Kidd this 
necessitated positive action that would ensure and preserve the accumulation of
‘congenital variations above the average to the exclusion of those below’ – in ot
words, eugenics, which aimed to select certain pools of germ plasm out of the 
reproductive equation.12 In one sense, we could dismiss Weismann’s theory as 
superannuated; for instance, in the ‘timeline’ published on the website of Genom
Network News, information supported by the J. Craig Venter Institute, Weismann’s
work is not cited, so it is not recognised as a milestone on the royal road to the 
discovery of DNA and the sequence of the human genome.13 But it is important to 
recall there are competing stories of intellectual inheritance: to go back to Dawkins 
again, in his conclusion to the first chapter of the Selfish Gene, he claims that ‘th
c
at the turn of the century—his doctrine of the continuity of the germ plasm’.14  
 
There’s a further point to make here about the relationship between eugenics and 
genetics, a topic that has been compellingly explored in a recent issue of the journ
new formations (spring 2007). I’m not for a moment suggesting that Dawkins is a 
eugenicist – he is manifestly not – but as Hilary Rose argues, there is culturally 
connection between genetics and eugenics, and to pretend otherwise is to seek to 
maintain ‘a soothing fiction’. But, she continues, ‘the whole power of soothing 
fictions lies in their hydra-like reproductive capacities. Cut off their heads and they
simply proliferate’.15 Literary and cultural h
p
stories about reproduction and inheritance.  
 
Let’s go back to that formulation of Dawkins in an attempt to illustrate this point: He 
refers to ‘pre-gene days’: how did we get to the naming of genes? When Dawkins 
refers to ‘pre-gene days’, he is referring of course to the days prior to the successes 
biochemical experimentation and microscopy that gradually identified the materials 
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particulate inheritance that constitute modern genetics. But he is also referring to a
movement in scientific nomenclature. The term ‘gene’ was coined by Johannse
1909 – a point that Niall Dillon reminds us of in his article about gene autonomy 
(Nature 2003) – during a hectic period when biologists such as De Vries were 
formulating theories of particulate inheritance while rediscovering the work of 
Mendel. Johannsen’s work performed crucial work in naming the ‘gene’, but also 
those crucial terms in genetics, ‘genotype’ (the particular genomic plan of the 





dividual); and these have important implications for a story told, or as he would put 









enetics is just the most recent 






it, ‘drafted’ about the ‘culture of the gene’ by the philosopher Howard Caygill. 
 
Caygill wrote his ‘Drafts for a Metaphysics of the Gene’ in 1996.16 While
seem to offer a grand narrative about the popularisation of science, its ‘draft’ status 
could be said to interrogate, in a productively fragmentary fashion, two crucial 
philosophical traditions in answering the question ‘what is special about the gene’. 
Those sources are Plato and Nietzsche, ‘the first and last of the metaphysicians’ 
Caygill. In Caygill’s reading of Nietzsche, ‘science’ fills the terrible gap left by ‘the 
death of God’ in the nineteenth century. Following Nietzsche, Caygill presents 
science as a Christian substitute, a new Platonism for the masses. Caygill’s a
examines the triumph of science in the nineteenth century as a new faith in, and
popular culture of, science which reinvented a Platonic Christianity as a 
metaphysic of science. It was precisely this kind of framework of assumption
that enabled Johannsen to Platonise the late nineteenth-century findings of 
particulate inheritance into the ‘ideas’ of the ‘gene’, the ‘genotype’, and the 
‘phenotype’ – a metaphysical legacy that molecular biologists continue to observe
yet be troubled by, as a popular ‘culture of genetics’ demands greater and greater 
degrees of trust be placed in the metaphysic (your guilt or innocence in a murder 
case may be determined as true or not by the ‘idea’ of DNA). Yet it is trust that is
bestowed with ambivalence. In twentieth-century genetics, it is the gene that figures 
as the unstable phenomenon, which at once seems to promise the abolition of nature 
and chance (the totally engineered subject), while being also the threat of the revenge
of chance as it re-enters the order from which, ostensibly, it has been eliminat
re-reading Plato and Nietszche, Caygill’s analysis points to another reason why 
the concept of the gene is not unique: for g
m
constituted upon positivist foundations.17 
 
Caygill also reminds us that it was not only the artists who were expelled from 
the city in the Republic – it was the physicians too, for supplementing nature w
their particular brand of techne (much in the way that imitative artists did). The 
physicians were to be re-admitted in the guise of philosophical legislators. O
course, it may be objected by practising scientists that Caygill’s narrative is too grand 
by half, and that he is indulging in ‘social constructivism’. But he is careful to
distinguish between the nuanced and workaday practices and findings of science, and 
what he describes as ‘the culture of genetics’. Thus, ‘Neither the fear of the 
abolition of chance in a technical order of necessity, nor the fear of the reven
chance against the same order have any real basis in the science, but have 
assumed considerable weight in the culture of genetics’. It seems to me that 
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Caygill implicitly draws a distinction between, to use Hans Reichenbach’s ter
(subsequently adapted by Christopher Norris), context of discovery, and context 












lurring’ of relations between the transitive and intransitive, literature and 
 
. Traditions of Discourse in Ian McEwan’s Saturday: fiction, genetics and 
 
t 
e of the 
l 
ly, he 
 Perowne adorns a wall in Downing Street). Saturday stages a 






18 While fictions of the iconic status of the gene figure in powerful, 
carefully circumscribed, ways, ‘literary’ fictions participate in the culture of 
genetics in challengingly complex ways. I want to suggest, in conclusion, that 
Saturday by Ian McEwan – an imitative artist who is also deeply attracted by t
techne of science and medicine – explores the ‘culture of genetics’ by engaging 
with the relationship between these ‘transitive and intransitive’ domains. In a 
sense, literary narrative can place itself at the exploratory interface between t
domains, and their competing claims. For McEwan’s fictive exploration of the 
relation between literature and genetics eschews any grand statements abou
human exceptionalism; in fact, his fiction works to suggest something vaguely
disturbing about the human ‘gift’ for apprehending literature as a mode of 
affective power, especially in the context of one of the meanings of the word 
gene: a switch or cultural receptor for mediating information between org
and environment. If the philosophy of critical realism has to be clear and rigoro
about the relative stratifications that separate the real, the actual and the 
empirical, then literature can still be viewed as that privileged space where th
‘b





Saturday is an urban fiction, a kind of homage to the Modernist literature of the city 
represented most obviously by Woolf’s Mrs Dalloway.19 It is also possible to see 
Saturday as a fiction that asks questions about who will legitimately legislate for the
city. Of course, in one sense, McEwan’s evolutionism finds Platonic questions abou
the governance of the ideal city-state no longer answerable. The governanc
appointed legislators is in one sense farcically detached and ineffective: the centra
character, a neurosurgeon Henry Perowne, meets Tony Blair at an official 
engagement, and a distracted Blair mistakes Perowne’s identity; interesting





Henry Perowne tends not to intellectualise his working life: a neurosurgeon who
specialisms are at once the molecular biologist’s knowledge of the micro-composites 
of life, and the engineer’s understanding of the body as a complex mechanism. 
McEwan nonetheless shows him striving to develop an understanding of the affect
dimensions of the culture that he inhabits, and a history of the expertise that he 
contributes to it, through a kind of education orchestrated by his daughter, Daisy. 
Daisy has read English at Oxford, and is a young published poet: she is determine
educate her father in the literary canon (Flaubert, Tolstoy, Conrad), but also the greats
of scientific writing. A recollected image of this reading frames the reader’s first 
encounter with the education of Henry Perowne. As Perowne re-awakes on Sa
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morning following his disrupted sleep in the early hours, a phrase passes throug
mind: ‘There is grandeur in this view of life’. Of course, as he himself comes 
gradually to realise, this is from Darwin, the closing paragraph of the Origin of 
Species, unconsciously recalled second hand from the biography that Daisy has ‘set’ 
him to study (Daisy conducts her relationship with her father rather in the manner of a 
tutorial), and read sleepily in the bath the night before. The section of the biog
he reads is about ‘the dash to complete the Origin’, and a ‘summary of the co
pages [of the Origin], amended in later editions’ (p.55). It leads to Perowne’s 
reflection on the creation story told by evolution, how out of war, death and 




ed, and even cities have evolved. Contexts of 
iscovery and contexts of scientific justification seem to mingle together in the 
 
, and the 
ience that has shaped modern culture. But his attempt to do so is haunted, or in his 
case thw
 
ond the boredom of a traffic tailback … He doesn’t 





verbalised consciousness of Perowne. 
 
The evolution of the city, and the illustrious traditions of scientific enquiry that have 
forged the present, flash through Perowne’s mind again as he becomes stuck in a 
traffic jam in London: McEwan sets Saturday on the day in February 2003 when up to 
a million people took to the streets of London to demonstrate against the impending 
invasion of Iraq. Perowne tries to take in the scene as it might have been seen by those
‘curious men of the English Enlightenment’ who gave birth to his world view
sc
arted, by literary possibilities that Daisy understands only too well: 
He tries to see it, or feel it, in historical terms, this moment in the 
last decades of the petroleum age, when a nineteenth-century device 
is brought to final perfection in the early years of the twenty first; 
when the unprecedented wealth of masses at serious play in the 
unforgiving modern city makes for a sight that no previous age could 
have imagined. Ordinary people! Rivers of light! He wants to make 
himself see it as Newton might, or his contemporaries, Boyle, 
Hooke, Wren, Willis – those clever, curious men of the English 
Enlightenment who for a few years held in their minds nearly all the 
world’s science. Surely, they would be awed … But he can’t quite 
trick himself into it. He can’t feel his way past the iron weight of the 
actual to see bey
escape (p.168). 
 
McEwan brings literature and science into cultural contest: Saturday is a day in the 
life of a professional man on his day off, a fiction that owes much to Woolf’s Mrs 
Dalloway: ‘this moment’ is an intertextual echo, but so too are Perowne’s attempts at
Modernist epiphanies, ‘Ordinary people! Rivers of light!’ But it’s a stand off, the 
realist surgeon cannot enter into the way of seeing mastered by his lyrical daughter. 
While Saturday is a novel in which texts that construct and enrich our literacy actually 
play a significant role, it still poses the question: if we come to know the justification 
of the neurosurgeon’s techne (we hear of Perowne’s skills in the operating theatre, his 
expertise in molecular biology and bodily engineering), what does literature do, how 
does it speak within a culture saturated by genetic science? The question begins to be
answered as Perowne steers his car away from the jam, and, accidentally, into the path 
of another car, dislodging its wing-mirror. The minor collision brings Perowne into
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the lower social orbit of Baxter and two other petty criminals who use the occasion as 
an attempt to extort money, and threaten Perowne with a beating when he resists. 
owever, Perowne notes ‘muscular restlessness’ in Baxter’s face and, the biochemist 
and eng
 
rish hallucinations and a meaningless end. This 
is how the brilliant machinery of being is undone by the tiniest of 
 
e 
 son, is 
nd 
l 
 of proofs (entitled My Saucy Bark) that sit upon the table; 










ineer in him immediately reaches this diagnosis:  
Chromosome four. The misfortune lies within a single gene, in an 
excessive repeat of a single sequence – CAG. Here’s biological 
determinism in its purest form. More than forty repeats of that one 
little codon and you’re doomed. Your future is fixed and easily 
foretold … nightma
faulty cogs. (p.94)  
 
Perowne offers his expert diagnosis, and it turns the situation, exploiting, not the
metaphysical, but indeed the magical thinking that hovers below the metaphysical 
justification of the patient-doctor relationship, and which continues to haunt the 
legitimating strategies of modern science: ‘They are together … in a world not of th
medical, but of the magical. When you are diseased, it is unwise to abuse the shaman’ 
(p.95). But it is borrowed time, and the episode ends in Baxter’s humiliation as he 
loses command of his henchmen, and the moment for violence. Perowne drives off, to 
a squash match, but will be made to pay. He does so later in the day as the family 
dinner with Perowne’s father in law, the poet John Grammaticus, Daisy and his
shattered when Rosalind Perowne returns from work with Baxter, his henchmen, a
a knife threatening her. It is in this context that McEwan finally ‘answers’ the 
question of what literature does. If Perowne’s ‘magical’ knowledge of ‘biological 
determinism’ shapes the first reversal of Baxter’s behaviour, then it is a literary recita
that shapes the second. Daisy refuses the invaders’ sexual taunts to read one of her 
‘dirty’ poems from the set
sh
passing it off as her own. 
 
What McEwan produces here is a curious kind of parody of literature’s civilising
mission, so frequently rehearsed in the nineteenth century and since. It seems to m
no coincidence that this moment turns on the understanding of an Arnold poem, 
Arnold being also the author of that great Victorian statement about the civilising 
mission of literature, Culture and Anarchy (1869). The twitching, ‘simian’-like 
Baxter, wracked by mood swings triggered by faulty genes, becomes a kind of cruelly
ironic Arnoldian best self, transformed by a literary conversion. All thoughts of rape
dissipate as he says ‘”You wrote that… it’s beautiful. You know that, don’t you. It’
beautiful. And you wrote it”’. (p.222). The episode is especially rich because of the 
way in which McEwan translates a lyrical moment into the stuff of storytelling. In 
narrating the episode, he does not ‘tell’ that the poem being recited is ‘Dover Beac
The reader oversees fragmented images grasped during the recital from Per
perspective; Perowne does not know and cannot identify the poem as Arnold’s, a 
further parody, perhaps, of I.A. Richards’s ‘experiments’ with Cambridge 
undergraduates in the 1920s, exposing them to unidentified poems which they were 
asked to close-read. Perowne finds many associations, many ‘subject positions’ from 
his life and his sense of Daisy’s life, in the discourse that is recited. McEwan see
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be suggesting that the civilising process that the poem effects upon Baxter is only one 
kind of affective response, and ironically it works most powerfully on the most 
genetically faulty and deranged person present. If the Library of Mendel has inscrib
an irrevocable genetic scri
ed 
pt for Baxter – ‘It is written’ (p.210) – the Library of Babel 
 characterised by indeterminacy. Literature multiplies the positions available for 
 
 and 











ised by a masterful practitioner such as McEwan, leads us 
 awkward and conflicting meanings, to be sure: but critical openings, and the 
ntithesis of reductionism. 
 
is
judgement and response.  
 
This is hardly a surprising or indeed unsettling conclusion to reach. But McEwan’s
fiction does, I would argue, generate more subtle challenges to received meanings. 
Indeed, it could be argued that Baxter’s faulty gene becomes both a ‘switch’,
receptor, for the appreciation of poetry, or literature as culture’s flagship. Something 
that ‘begins’ in genetics, or the intransitive domain of ontological necessity, 
contributes powerfully to the transitive domain of literary and cultural activity
also does so contingently, relatively: that Baxter and Perowne ‘hear’ such different 
versions of the poem suggests that there is no universal genetic ‘programme’ 
underwriting literary apprehension as some reductive modes of neo-Darwinia
been inclined to argue.20 We return then to those varied ‘meanings’ of the gene t
Matt Ridley has codified in Nature Via Nurture. McEwan’s fiction playfully 
mobilises their varied meanings: the gene as ancestral archive which condem
Baxter to a terrible fate, but also the gene as switch and receptor which precisely 
generates culture in its profoundly intransitive modes. McEwan’s fiction, in 
presenting these different meanings, draws upon historically constituted traditions of 
discourse. Baxter is made from the naturalist tradition of European fiction, a characte
determined by heredity, a descendant of the fiction of Gissing and Zola. But he is also
touched by those influential discourses of culture and aesthetics that have pr
themselves as the antithesis of scientific determinism. In one sense this demonstrates 
a key claim of this article: that, from a literary perspective, there is nothing 
particularly special about the gene because it constitutes the most recent episode in a 
long and inconclusive story about the nature of heredity, the stories that we have 
inherited about the relations between naturalistic and social inheritance. At the same 
time, there is of course something wonderfully inventive and distinctive about
particular workings of McEwan’s fictive exploration of genetics: it does not provide
us with unshakeable ground from which to judge the respective claims of the 
transitive and intransitive domains, in fact it blurs the boundaries between 
Consequently we have to make meanings out of the contingencies explored by 
narrative practice. Perhaps this is the point: while Caygill has identified a 
metaphysical ‘culture of the gene’ which does indeed exert a powerful and at times 
ideologically constraining effect in the popular understanding of science, literatu
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